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Abstract
Suppose that in a coalition formation game each participant has a preference list of the other
participants and she prefers a set S to a set T if and only if she prefers the worst participant
of S to the worst participant of T . We consider three de6nitions of stability. In the case of no
indi8erences stable partitions cannot contain very large sets and their existence can be decided
polynomially. However, in the presence of ties one of the existence problems is NP-complete, the
other is polynomial and the existence of a polynomial algorithm for the third one is still open.
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1. Introduction
In the stable roommates problem the participants are to be partitioned into pairs in
such a way that no pair of participants who are not matched in a current matching
would be strictly better o8 together. A polynomial algorithm for deciding the existence
of a stable matching was derived by Irving in [5] for the case when participants’
preferences contain no ties. Ronn [8] showed that the existence problem for the stable
roommates with indi8erences is NP-complete.
A possible generalization of the stable roommates problem is to allow groups of
arbitrary cardinality to be formed. If preferences of participants over groups are derived
from the worst participant of the group, we get W-preferences, introduced in [3]. In
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[3] it was already shown that the stable roommates problem and theW-stable partition
problem have some similarities. In the present paper we explore these similarities more
deeply. In particular, for three di8erent de6nitions of blocking inspired by [6] and [7],
we show that all existence problems in the case without ties are polynomially solvable
while the complexity of the same problems in the presence of ties exactly corresponds
to their stable roommates counterparts.
W-preferences are in a sense a dual notion to B-preferences, where preferences
of participants over groups are derived from the best participant of the group. Here,
stable partitions in the case without ties always exist and one of them can be found
polynomially, while in the presence of ties the existence problem is also NP-complete
(see [1–3]).
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic
notions. Section 3 studies the properties of stable partitions. In Section 4 we modify
Irving’s Stable roommates algorithm for use in theW-stable partitions context. Section
5 deals with problems with ties.
2. Basic denitions
N = {1; 2; : : : ; n} is the set of participants. Each participant i∈N is endowed with
a reKexive, transitive and complete relation ¡i on the set N , called the preference
relation. If j ¡i k and k ¡i j, we say that i is indi7erent between j and k and write
j ∼i k. If j ¡i k and not j ∼i k, we write j i k and say that i prefers j to k strictly.
(Notice that j 4i k and j ≺i k are equivalent to k ¡i j and k i j, respectively.)
Participants j such that j ¡i i are for i acceptable, the others are unacceptable. The
preference relation of participant i will usually be represented as an ordered list P(i) of
acceptable participants (excluding i), with the understanding that participants appearing
earlier are preferred to those appearing later in the list and brackets denote indi8erence.
The n-tuple P = (P(1); P(2); : : : ; P(n)) of preference relations is called a preference
pro8le.
Let Ni stand for {S ⊆ N ; i∈ S}.
If S ∈Ni ; S = {i}, then by Wi(S) we denote an arbitrary participant j∈ S − {i}
such that j 4i k for all k ∈ S −{i} and by Bi(S) any participant j∈ S −{i} such that
k 4i j for all k ∈ S−{i}. For S={i} we setWi(S)=Bi(S)=i. Obviously, if S; T ∈Ni
are such that S ⊆ T and S = {i} then Wi(T ) 4iWi(S) and Bi(T )¡i Bi(S).
Denition 1. Let S; T ∈Ni. Then participant i W-prefers a set S to a set T , S ¡i T ,
if Wi(S)¡iWi(T ).
Clearly, participant i W-prefers {i} to any set containing at least one unacceptable
participant and W-prefers any set containing only acceptable participants to {i}.
Denition 2. We say that M = {M1; M2; : : : ; Mr} is a partition of N if Mp ∩ Mq = ∅
for all distinct p; q and
⋃r
p=1Mp = N . The set in M containing participant i will be
denoted by M (i).
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Denition 3. A nonempty set Z ⊆ N W-blocks a partition M, if
(∀i∈Z)Z i M (i):
A partition for which no W-blocking set exists, is said to be W-stable.
Denition 4. A nonempty set Z ⊆ N weakly W-blocks a partition M, if
(∀i∈Z)Z ¡i M (i) and (∃j∈Z)Z j M (j):
A partition for which no weaklyW-blocking set exists, is said to be stronglyW-stable.
Denition 5. A nonempty set Z ⊆ N sub-W-blocks a partition M, if
(∀i∈Z)Z ¡i M (i) and Z = M (i):
A partition for which no sub-W-blocking set exists, is said to be super W-stable.
Obviously, each super W-stable partition is strongly W-stable and each strongly
W-stable partition is W-stable. The converse implications are not true.
In this paper we shall deal with the following problems:
Problem WS: Given a set N and a preference pro6le P on N with all
preferences strict, does there exist a W-stable partition?
Problem StronglyWS: Given a set N and a preference pro6le P on N with all pre-
ferences strict, does there exist a strongly W-stable partition?
Problem SuperWS: Given a set N and a preference pro6le P on N with all
preferences strict, does there exist a super W-stable partition?
The above problems, when preferences of participants are allowed to contain ties,
will be denoted by WST, StronglyWST and SuperWST, respectively.
3. Properties ofW-stable partitions
The following observation is trivial.
Lemma 6. If in a partition M, some participant is in a common set with an unac-
ceptable participant, then M is neither W-stable nor strongly W-stable nor super
W-stable.
The following lemma will simplify some proofs:
Lemma 7. Any partition M that is not super W-stable, not strongly W-stable or
not W-stable is sub-W-blocked, weakly W-blocked or W-blocked, respectively, by
a singleton or a two-element set.
Proof. Suppose that a partitionM is not stronglyW-stable. Then there exists a weakly
W-blocking set Z , such that ∀i∈Z : Wi(Z) ¡i Wi(M (i)) and ∃j∈Z : Wj(Z) j
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Wj(M (j)). If |Z |6 2, then the assertion follows, otherwise denote by k an arbitrary
participant in Z di8erent from j and let us consider the set Z ′= {j; k} ⊂ Z . Obviously
Wj(Z ′) ¡j Wj(Z) j Wj(M (j)) and Wk(Z ′) ¡k Wk(Z) ¡k Wk(M (k)), hence
{j; k} weakly W-blocks M. For a W-blocking or sub-W-blocking set Z with |Z |¿ 2
an arbitrary two-element subset Z ′ ⊂ Z also W-blocks or sub-W-blocks, respectively,
the given partition M.
Since testing a given partition for stability is, due to Lemma 7, polynomial, we have
Corollary 8. All the considered problems belong to class NP.
Now we shall study the structure of stable partitions.
Theorem 9. Let a preference pro8le P on a set of participants N be given and let
M be a strongly W-stable partition of N. Then
(i) if P contains no indi7erences then |M |6 2 for each set M ∈M;
(ii) if M ∈M with |M |¿ 2 then Bi(M) ∼iWi(M) for each participant i∈M .
Proof. Let M be a strongly W-stable partition.
(i) Let P contain no indi8erences and let M ∈M be a partition set such that |M |¿ 2.
Let i∈M be arbitrary, denote j=Bi(M). We show that the set Z={i; j}={i;Bi(M)} ⊂
M weakly W-blocks M.
Due to Lemma 6, participants i; j are mutually acceptable. Moreover, Wj(Z)= i ¡j
Wj(M) andWi(Z)=j=Bi(M) iWi(M), since M contains at least three participants
and preferences are strict. Hence participant i strictly prefers {i; j} to M and participant
j is not worse o8 in Z than in M. Therefore Z weakly W-blocks M, a contradiction.
(ii) Let us suppose that M contains a set M; |M |¿ 2 and there exists a participant
i∈M with j=Bi(M) iWi(M). Then Z={i; j} weaklyW-blocksM, sinceWi(Z)=
j =Bi(M) iWi(M) and Wj(Z) = i ¡j Wj(M). A contradiction.
Theorem 10. Let a preference pro8le P on a set of participants N be given and let
M be a super W-stable partition of N. Then |M |6 2 for each M ∈M.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 9(i), but for the participant j we do not need
strict preference Wi(Z) i Wi(M), hence we do not need the assumption of strict
preferences.
Theorem 11. Let a preference pro8le P with strict preferences on a set of participants
N be given. Then a partition M is super W-stable if and only if it is strongly
W-stable.
Proof. The “only if” implication is trivial.
For the “if” direction suppose that a partition M is strongly W-stable but not
super W-stable. Hence there exists a sub-W-blocking set Z , which is not weakly
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W-blocking, which means
(∀i∈Z) Z ∼i M (i); or; equivalently; (∀i∈Z) Wi(Z) ∼iWi(M (i)) (1)
Due to Lemma 7 we can suppose |Z |6 2. If Z={i} then, sinceM is stronglyW-stable
and preferences are strict, (1) implies i=Wi(M (i)) and hence M (i)={i}. So Z cannot
be sub-W-blocking.
Now suppose that Z={i; j}. Since preferences are strict andM is stronglyW-stable,
Theorem 9 implies that |M (i)|6 2 and |M (j)|6 2. Let us distinguish two
cases.
Case I: One of the sets M (i); M (j) is singleton, say M (i)= {i}. Then, since prefer-
ences are strict and Z is not weakly W-blocking, we have j ∼i i, so i= j and Z={i},
a contradiction.
Case II: Both M (i); M (j) are two-element, say M (i)={i; k}; M (j)={j; l}. Now we
must have j ∼i k and i ∼j l, hence j = k and i = l, so Z =M (i) =M (j) = {i; j}, a
contradiction.
Theorem 12. Let a preference pro8le P on a set of participants N be given and let
M be a W-stable partition of N. Then
(i) if P contains no indi7erences then |M |6 3 for each set M ∈M;
(ii) if M ∈M with |M |¿ 2 then i ∼j Wj(M) or j ∼i Wi(M) for each pair of
participants i; j∈M; i = j.
Proof. Let M be a W-stable partition.
(i) Let all the preferences be strict and M contain a set M = {i; j; k; l; : : :}. Without
loss of generality we can assume that participants in M are ordered according to their
position in the preference list of participant i, i.e. j i k i l i : : : :
If the set {i; j} is not W-blocking, we must have i =Wj(M), and in particular
k j i. If the set {i; k} is not W-blocking, since k i l, we must have i =Wk(M),
hence j k i. But then Z={j; k} is W-blocking, since both j; k have strictly improved
compared to M , as they got rid of i.
(ii) Let us suppose that M contains a set M , |M |¿ 3, and there exists a pair of
participants i; j∈M ; i = j such that i j Wj(M) and simultaneously j i Wi(M).
Then Z = {i; j} W-blocks M, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 12 implies the following
Corollary 13. Let M be a W-stable partition for a preference pro8le P with all
preferences strict. If {p; r; s}∈M then participants p; r; s can be labelled in such a
way that r p s; s r p and p s r.
We shall use this Corollary later, in our analysis of Irving’s algorithm.
One of its implications is that after reducing the preference lists of participants
p; r; s to contain only themselves, we get the following preference pro6le,
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denoted by P1:
P(p) = r; s;
P(r) = s; p;
P(s) = p; r:
So a three-element set {p; r; s; } in a W-stable partition can be considered as a special
case of a stable pro6le (a de6nition will be introduced later).
Example 1. Let us have the following preference pro6le P2 for 6ve participants:
P(a) = b; e; c; d;
P(b) = c; a; d; e;
P(c) = d; b; e; a;
P(d) = e; c; a; b;
P(e) = a; d; b; c:
We want to prove that for P2 noW-stable partition exists. Suppose that there exists
a W-stable partition M. Since everybody is acceptable for everybody, a W-stable
partition can contain at most one singleton. If {a}∈M, then since a is the 6rst choice
of e, participant e will for sure prefer {a; e} to M (e) and as a also prefers {a; e}
to {a}, we have a blocking set. As each participant is the 6rst choice of some other
participant, a similar argument implies that M contains no singleton.
Therefore it is suScient to suppose that M contains one two-element and one
three-element set. Without loss of generality (since participants are indistinguishable
with respect to cyclic permutations) we can assume that participant a is in a three-
element set with participants i and j, where i; j∈{b; c; d; e}; i = j and i a j. Corollary
13 implies that j i a and a j i. There are only three possibilities for participant i:
i = b; i = e or i = c.
If i= b, then since participant b prefers to participant a only participant c, we must
have j = c, but a ≺c b, a contradiction of Corollary 13.
Case i= e is not possible because there is no participant whom participant e prefers
to a.
If i = c, then since the only participant to whom a prefers c is d, we must have
j = d, but a ≺d c, again a contradiction.
4. Finding aW-stable partition in the no-ties case
Cechl%arov%a and Romero-Medina in [3] showed that in the case of strict preferences,
the StronglyWS problem is very close to the stable roommates problem and proposed
how to use Irving’s stable roommates algorithm to 6nd a strongly W-stable partition.
For the WS problem, if the stable roommates problem has a solution for a given pref-
erence pro6le, then this solution is a W-stable partition. However, there may exist
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W-stable partitions even in the case when no stable roommates solution exists. To
6nd W-stable partitions correctly we will analyze Irving’s stable roommates algorithm
even further and show how its modi6cation can be used for 6nding W-stable par-
titions. In our analysis of Irving’s algorithm we shall follow its presentation in [4],
Chapter 4.
The main idea of Irving’s algorithm is to successively delete pairs from the given
preference pro6le to get reduced preference pro6les. Pairs deleted in the 6rst phase of
the algorithm cannot be stable pairs (i.e. belong to some stable matching) and hence
cannot be in a common set in a W-stable partition. In the second phase the so-called
rotations are eliminated. If the given preference pro6le contains a stable roommates
matching then there is a stable roommates matching (and hence a W-stable partition)
in the preference pro6le obtained after eliminating a rotation too, on assumption that this
elimination does not empty any preference list. Therefore we have to consider the case
when elimination of a rotation causes some preference lists to become empty. Before
deriving some results, we shall recall the notions of a rotation and its elimination. For
a reduced preference pro6le T and a participant x, fT (x); sT (x); ‘T (x) denote the 6rst,
second and the last entry in the preference list of participant x in pro6le T. Since our
6rst phase is identical to that of Irving, we shall always suppose that we deal with a
stable reduced preference pro6le, i.e. one which ful6lls the properties listed in Lemma
4.2.2. of [4], p. 168, namely,
(1) fT (x) = y if and only if y = ‘T (x)
(2) a pair {x; y} is absent from T if and only if x prefers ‘T(x) to y or y prefers
‘T(y) to x.
This means that no pair that is not present in the reduced pro6le can form a stable
pair nor block a partition present in the current pro6le.
Denition 14. A sequence  = (x0; y0)(x1; y1) : : : (xr−1; yr−1) is said to be a rotation
exposed in a preference pro6le T, if
yi = fT (xi) and yi+1 = sT (xi) for all i = 0; 1; : : : ; r − 1;
where indices are taken modulo r, when necessary. The sets X ={x0; x1; : : : ; xr−1}, and
Y = {y0; y1; : : : ; yr−1} are called the X -set and the Y -set of the rotation and denoted
by X and Y, respectively.
Denition 15. To cancel a pair {x; y} from a preference pro6le T means to cancel
participant x from the list of participant y and symmetrically, participant y from the
preference list of participant x.
To eliminate a rotation =(x0; y0)(x1; y1) : : : (xr−1; yr−1) from a preference pro6le T
means to cancel each pair {yi; z} such that yi prefers xi−1 to z for all i=0; 1; : : : ; r−1.
The obtained pro6le will be denoted by T=.
Theorem 16. Let  = (x0; y0)(x1; y1) : : : (xr−1; yr−1) be a rotation exposed in a pref-
erence pro8le T. If T= contains an empty preference list then r is odd and there
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exists an integer k, coprime with r, k = 0 and k = r − 1, such that ym = xm+k and,
in T, PT(xm) = xm+k ; xm+k+1 for all m= 0; 1; : : : ; r − 1, indices taken modulo r.
Proof. Lemma 4.2.7. of [4] implies that when a rotation  is eliminated no person who
is not in X∩Y can obtain an empty preference list. So suppose that participant xi with
preference list PT(xi)=yi; yi+1; : : : has an empty preference list after the elimination of
. This means that during the elimination also the pair {xi; yi+1} has been cancelled.
This could only be because xi is yj for some j and yj prefers xj−1 to yi+1. Since yi+1
is the second entry in PT(xi)=PT(yj), this means that xj−1 must be the 6rst entry in
PT(xi), or that xj−1 = yi. Now let us compare the preference lists of participants xj−1
and yi. We know that ‘T (yi) = xi and sT (xj−1) = yj = xi. Hence the preference list of
xj−1 contains just two entries and it is PT(xj−1) = PT(yi) = yj−1; yj = xi−1; xi. This
implies further equality xi−1 = yj−1. Now by induction we get
xm = ym+j−i and xm = ym+i−j+1 (2)
and
PT(xm) = xm+i−j; xm+i−j+1
for m= 0; 1; : : : ; r − 1, indices taken modulo r.
Further, Eqs. (2) for m= 0 imply that
0 ≡ j − i (mod r) and 0 ≡ i − j + 1 (mod r) (3)
which in turn gives 2(i − j) + 1 ≡ 0 (mod r). Hence r is odd and k = i − j and r are
coprime. Clearly k = 0 and k = r−1, because equations ym=xm and ym=xm+r−1=xm−1
are in a contradiction of the de6nition of a rotation.
This proves the assertions of the Theorem.
A rotation with properties described in Theorem 16 will be called an r-rotation,
speci6cally, depending on r, a 3-rotation, 5-rotation, etc. Clearly, in an r-rotation 
we have X = Y, each x∈X has just two entries in PT(x) and the participants with
empty preference lists in T= are just the participants in X.
We can now state and prove three theorems that form the basis of the second phase
of our modi6ed algorithm. The 6rst one is very similar to Theorem 4.2.1 from [4].
Theorem 17. If there is a W-stable partition embedded in a pro8le T, and  is a
rotation exposed in T such that pro8le T= contains no empty lists, then there is a
W-stable partition embedded in T=.
Proof. Let M be a W-stable partition embedded in T, and suppose that a rotation
=(x0; y0)(x1; y1) : : : (xr−1; yr−1) exposed in T is not an r-rotation. Now consider two
cases.
(i) There exists i; 06 i6 r − 1, such that participants xi and yi are not in a com-
mon set in M. Then, since an embedded W-stable partition M is a special case of
a subpro6le, it follows from Corollary 4.2.1. in [4] that partition M is embedded
in T=.
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(ii) Otherwise, if participants xi and yi are in a common set in M for all i; 06 i6
r − 1, we 6rst show that |M (xi)|= 2 for all participants xi. Let us suppose that M =
M (xi) = {xi; yi; z}∈M for some i; 06 i6 r − 1. We have yi+1 ¡xi z and since
M (yi+1) contains xi+1, who is the last choice of yi+1, if yi+1 xi z then Z = {xi; yi+1}
W-blocks the partition M. Therefore z ¡xi yi+1 and since preferences are strict,
z = yi+1. Hence M = {xi; yi; yi+1}. But since xi+1 ∈M (yi+1) and xi+1 = xi, we have
M = {xi; yi = xi+1; yi+1}. If we use the same argument as we did for participant xi, we
get that participant xi+1 can be in M only if xi=yi+2. But then also participant xi+2 must
be in M and this is only possible if yi+1=xi+2. Again, so as the pair {xi+2; yi+3} is not
W-blocking, we must have xi+1 =yi+3. This means we have xi =yi+2; xi+1 =yi =yi+3
and xi+2 = yi+1 and so rotation  = : : : (xi; xi+1)(xi+1; xi+2)(xi+2; xi)(: : : ; xi+1) : : : is a
3-rotation, a contradiction.
We have just shown that in case (ii) partition M contains all the pairs {xi; yi}. Now
the pairs {xi; yi} are replaced by {xi; yi+1} for each i= 0; 1; : : : ; r − 1 and similarly as
in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1. in [4], it is shown that we get a matching; these pairs
remain undeleted, and the new matching is indeed a W-stable partition.
Theorem 18. If in a stable pro8le T an r-rotation exists with r¿ 5 then there is no
W-stable partition embedded in T.
Proof. Let M be a W-stable partition embedded in T and let  be an r-rotation
with r¿ 5. Since each participant xm ∈X has only two acceptable participants in T
(namely xm+k and xm+k+1 from X, see the formulation of Theorem 16), no participant
from X = Y can be in a common set in M with a participant that does not belong
to X. In other words, all participants from X have in their partition sets in M only
participants belonging to X. No participant xi ∈X can be alone in M, since he is the
6rst choice of participant xi−k and xi−k is acceptable to xi, so the pair {xi; xi−k} would
block any partition in which {xi}∈M. Since the cardinality of X is odd, M must
contain at least one three-element set, say M = {xm; xm+k ; xm+k+1}. The preference lists
of participants in M are
P(xm) = xm+k ; xm+k+1;
P(xm+k) = xm+2k ; xm+2k+1;
P(xm+k+1) = xm+2k+1; xm+2k+2
and when we set p = xm, r = xm+k , s = xm+k+1, Corollary 13 implies the following
system of congruences modulo r:
m+ k ≡ m+ 2k + 2
m+ k + 1 ≡ m+ 2k
m+ 2k + 1 ≡ m
which is equivalent to k ≡ −2 ≡ 1 and 2k ≡ −1 (mod r). This is only possible if
r = 3. A contradiction.
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Fig. 1. Phase 2 of the W-stable algorithm.
Theorem 19. If M is a W-stable partition embedded in a pro8le T, and if  =
(x0; x1)(x1; x2)(x2; x0) is a 3-rotation exposed in T, then
(i) partition M contains the set {x0; x1; x2} and
(ii) partition M′=M−{{x0; x1; x2}} is W-stable in pro8le T′ obtained from T by
deleting participants x0; x1; x2.
Proof. (i) Let M be a W-stable partition present in pro6le T. Then the only possible
members of the sets M (x0); M (x1) and M (x2) are participants x0; x1 and x2. But if
any participant i∈{x0; x1; x2} were alone, since he is the 6rst choice of some other
participant j∈{x0; x1; x2}, the set {i; j} would be W-blocking. Hence each W-stable
partition present in pro6le T contains {x0; x1; x2}.
(ii) Trivial.
Summarizing, Phase 2 of the W-stable partitions algorithm is formally written in
Fig. 1. (Notice that when a 3-rotation is encountered, the three participants involved
are deleted together with their preference lists, so no empty preference list arises.)
Its output are the three-element sets corresponding to 3-rotations identi6ed during the
algorithm and the 6nal pro6le T, which, in a similar way to the matching case,
gives the two-element sets of the partition, by the condition {x; y}∈M if and only if
PT(x) = y, which in turns happens if and only if PT(y) = x.
5. Problems with ties
The similarity of the W-stable partition problem to the stable roommates problem
extends also to the case with ties.
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First we show that the WST problem is NP-complete. For this, we shall only slightly
modify Ronn’s construction [8] used to show that the stable roommates problem with
ties is NP-complete. First we describe Ronn’s polynomial transformation from the
restricted 3-SAT problem to the stable roommates problem in greater detail.
The restricted 3-SAT problem (which is NP-complete, see e.g. [4, p. 210]) is to
decide the satis6ability of a boolean formula in conjunctive normal form with each
clause containing at most three literals and each literal appearing at most twice in the
formula. Moreover, we shall suppose that no clause contains a literal as well as its
negation.
Ronn constructed the following preference pro6le, denoted by P3, for each restricted
boolean formula B with n boolean variables x1; x2; : : : ; xn and m clauses C1; C2; : : : ; Cm:
P(ui) = f1(Ci); f2(Ci); f3(Ci); vi; wi; : : :
P(vi) = wi; ui; : : :
P(wi) = ui; vi; : : :
P(pjk) = (qjk ; rjk); : : :
P(qjk) = pjk ; rj;3−k ; u(qjk); g′s in arbitrary order; : : :
P(rjk) = pjk ; qj;3−k ; u(rjk); g′s in arbitrary order; : : :
P(gl) = q′s and r′s in arbitrary order; : : :
The interpretation of individual participants is the following:
• Participants ui; vi; wi for i = 1; 2; : : : ; m represent clause Ci. Participants pj1; pj2; qj1;
qj2; rj1; rj2 for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n represent variable xj, where participants qj1; qj2 corre-
spond to the 6rst and the second occurrence of literal xj in the formula and par-
ticipants rj1; rj2 correspond to the 6rst and the second occurrence of literal Uxj in
the formula, respectively. Participants gl for l= 1; 2; : : : ; 2n−m are called “garbage
collectors”.
• Functions f1(Ci); f2(Ci); f3(Ci) denote the participants, corresponding to the 6rst,
second and third literal in clause Ci, respectively. If a clause Ci contains only two
literals, participant f3(Ci) does not occur in the preference list of ui.
• u(qjk)=ui if the kth occurrence of literal xj appears in clause Ci, similarly u(rjk)=ui
if the kth occurrence of literal Uxj appears in clause Ci. If this literal is not present
in the formula at all, these inputs are simply missing.
• The dots indicate that the rest of the participants may appear in arbitrary order.
Theorem 20 (Ronn). P3 admits a stable roommates solution if and only if boolean
formula B is satis8able.
To prove the NP-completeness of the problem WST, we 6rst de6ne the preference
pro6le for a given boolean formula. Like Ronn, for each variable xj, j=1; 2; : : : ; n, we
shall have participants pjk ; qjk ; rjk for k=1; 2; garbage collectors gl for l=1; 2; : : : ; 2n−
m, but for a clause Ci we shall have instead of ui; vi and wi 6ve clause participants
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ai; bi; ci; di; ei with the following preferences:
P(ai) = f1(Ci); f2(Ci); f3(Ci); bi; ei; ci; di; : : :
P(bi) = ci; ai; di; ei; : : :
P(ci) = di; bi; ei; ai; : : :
P(di) = ei; ci; ai; bi; : : :
P(ei) = ai; di; bi; ci; : : :
Preferences of participants pjk ; qjk ; rjk and gl are the same as in P3, only the value
of u(qjk) and u(rjk) is now participant ai of clause Ci that contains the corresponding
literal. We shall call the derived preference pro6le P4.
We want to prove that P4 admits a W-stable partition if and only if the original
boolean formula B is satis6able.
Let us have a satisfying truth assignment for formula B. We can use a similar
construction of a W-stable partition M for P4 as Ronn did for the pro6le P3:
(i) For each i=1; 2; : : : ; m select the participant fl(Ci) which corresponds to the 6rst
true literal in Ci and create sets {ai; fl(Ci)}; {bi; ci} and {di; ei}.
(ii) For each j = 1; 2; : : : ; n: if xj is true, then create sets {pj1; rj1} and {pj2; rj2}; if
xj is false, then create sets {pj1; qj1} and {pj2; qj2}.
(iii) The number of participants rjk ; qjk who are matched neither to some ai nor
to pjk (called leftovers) is equal to the number of garbage collectors, so they
are matched according to some stable marriage matching involving leftovers and
garbage collectors.
Lemma 21. The constructed partition M is W-stable.
Proof. We will show that no participant can be in a W-blocking set:
(1) Since, in M, all participants pjk are in their favourite sets {pjk ; qjk} or {pjk ; rjk},
no W-blocking set can contain a participant pjk ; nor a participant qjk for which
xj is false, nor a participant rjk for which xj is true.
(2) Participants ai prefer to their partition sets {ai; fl(Ci)} only sets {ai; fs(Ci)}
for s¡ l. Since fs(Ci) can be either a participant qjk for which xj is false,
or a participant rjk for which xj is true and these participants are already ex-
cluded, a W-blocking set cannot contain a participant ai. Participants bi and di
have in their sets their favourites, so none of them can be in a W-blocking
set. Participants ci and ei prefer to their partition sets only sets with excluded
participants di and bi, so they will not W-block the constructed partition M
either.
(3) Participant qjk , who is in M with some participant ai, prefers to ai only partici-
pants pjk and rj;3−k , but both of them have in M their 6rst choice sets, see (1).
For the same reason also participants rjk paired with some ai are excluded from
W-blocking.
(4) Leftovers and garbage collectors will also 6nd no partner for a W-blocking set,
due to (iii) and (1),(2),(3).
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Hence, we have shown that based on a satisfying truth assignment, a W-stable
partition can be de6ned. For the converse implication, namely de6ning a satisfying
truth assignment on the basis of a W-stable partition, we need 6rst to derive some
properties of W -stable partitions for P4.
Lemma 22. If M is a W-stable partition for P4, then for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; m there
exists some l= 1; 2; 3 such that {ai; fl(Ci)}; {bi; ci}; {di; ei}∈M.
Proof. Let us have aW-stable partition M for preference pro6le P4. Since everybody
is acceptable for everybody and the number of participants is even, M cannot contain
singletons. Fix i and for a participant u∈{ai; bi; ci; di; ei} let us call a participant v
inferior for u if Wu({ai; bi; ci; di; ei}) u v.
Participant ai is the 6rst choice of participant ei, ei is the 6rst choice of di, di is the
6rst choice of ci and ci is the 6rst choice of bi. Therefore participants ai; ci; di; ei cannot
be in M in a common set with inferior participants, because then sets {ai; ei}; {ei; di};
{di; ci}, or {ci; bi} respectively, will W-block M.
Suppose that participant bi is in M with one of his inferior participants. Then partic-
ipant ai can be in M only with some fl(Ci), because otherwise {ai; bi} will W-block
M. But then {ci; di; ei}∈M and {di; ei} W-blocks M, a contradiction.
Hence we have shown, that no participant ai; bi; ci; di; ei can be in a W-stable par-
tition with an inferior participant. Example 1 implies that we can create no W-stable
partition, where participants ai; bi; ci; di; ei are together in one two-element and one
three-element set. Hence the only possibility is that participant ai is in partition M
with one or two participants from {f1(Ci); f2(Ci); f3(Ci)} and participants bi; ci; di; ei
form two two-element sets.
Now we show that |M (ai)| = 2. To get a contradiction, suppose that M (ai) =
{ai; ); *}, where ) is a participant qjk or rjk and * is a participant qj′k′ and rj′k′ and
j = j′ (because no clause contains the same literal twice nor a literal as well as
its negation). But ai prefers ) before * if the literal corresponding to ) is written
before the literal corresponding to * in clause Ci and ) prefers ai before * due
to the de6nition of the preference lists of q’s and r’s. Hence {ai; )} is a blocking
set.
So it follows that for every i=1; 2; : : : ; m the partition M must contain {ai; fl(Ci)}
for some l= 1; 2; 3 and sets {bi; ci} and {di; ei}.
Lemma 23. If in a W-stable partition participant qjk for some k = 1; 2 and
j = 1; 2; : : : ; n is in a common set with some participant ai, then neither rj1 nor rj2
can be in a common set with any participant as.
Proof. Let us suppose that in a W-stable partition M there is a participant qjk in a
common set with a participant ai. Without loss of generality we can assume that k=1.
If participant rj1 is in a common set with some participant as, then the set {pj1; qj1}
W-blocks M. If participant rj2 is in a common set with some participant as, then the
set {qj1; rj2} W-blocks the partition M.
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Lemma 24. If in aW-stable partition participant rjk for some k=1; 2 and j=1; 2; : : : ; n
is in a common set with some participant ai, then neither qj1 nor qj2 can be in a
common set with any participant as.
Proof. Similar to the proof of the previous Lemma.
Hence based on a W-stable partition we can de6ne the boolean values of the vari-
ables in the following way:
• xj will be true, if at least one of the participants qj1; qj2 is in a common set with a
participant ai
• xj will be false, if at least one of the participants rj1; rj2 is in a common set with a
participant ai
• otherwise xj can be arbitrary
In the light of what has been said, this de6nition causes no conKict and since for each
clause Ci participant ai is in a common set with a participant corresponding to a true
literal contained in Ci, formula B is satis6ed.
To summarize, we have just proved
Theorem 25. Problem WST is NP-complete.
On the other hand, Theorem 10 implies that also in the case with ties each set in a
super W-stable partition has cardinality at most 2, so a super W-stable partition is a
super stable matching. Since Irving and Manlove in [7] derived a polynomial algorithm
to 6nd a super stable matching, this algorithm also 6nds a super W-stable partition.
Theorem 26. There exists a polynomial algorithm to decide the existence of super
W-stable partition also in the case with ties.
However, the polynomiality of the strongly stable roommates is an open problem
and this is also the case for strongly W-stable partitions.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced theW-preferences of players and studied partitions
that are stable according to three di8erent de6nitions. It is quite striking that even if
we allow sets of arbitrary cardinality, the W-preferences lead to solutions very similar
to the stable roommates case, in the case with no indi8erences as well as in the case
with ties.
Notice that for a similar problem, where the preferences of players are derived from
the best player of a set, the situation is analogous: there exists a polynomial algorithm
deciding the existence of a stable partition in the case with no ties (see [1]) and the
existence problem is NP-complete in the case with ties (see [3]).
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One might argue that it is unrealistic to expect that people would decide their prefer-
ences over sets only according to the best or the worst participant of a set, respectively.
However, the authors are not aware of any attempt to model a more complex, but still
tractable, preference criterion over sets.
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